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Federal regulations governing human subjects research do not address key ques-
tions raised by incidental neuroimaging findings, including the scope of a
researcher’s disclosure with respect to the possibility of incidental findings and
the question whether a researcher has an affirmative legal cuty to seek, detect,
and report incidental findings. The scope of researcher duties may, however, be
mapped with reference to common law doctrine, including fiduciary, tort, con-
tract, and bailment theories of liability.
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Incidental findings may be defined as observations of potential
clinical significance that are unexpectedly discovered in healthy
subjects or patients recruited to brain imaging research studies
and that are unrelated to the purpose or variables of the study
(Illes et al., 2006). During the last ten years, several groups of
scientists have examined the extent to which neuroimaging research
reveals incidental arteriovenous malformations, brain tumors,
developmental abnormalities, and other conditions in research
participants (Vernooij et al., 2007). Current data suggests that
15 to 50% of asymptomatic research subjects have a brain anomaly,
depending on age, and that findings are clinically significant in
2 to 8% of all asymptomatic subjects (Illes, 2006). Although sub-
jects report that they expect research scans to detect abnormalities
if they exist and that they want incidental findings communicated
to them, procedures for handling incidental findings vary widely
(Kirschen et al., 2006).
Incidental findings have drawn significant attention in the
neuroethics literature (Illes, 2006; Illes, Kirschen, et al., 2004; Illes,
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Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach 243
Rosen, et al., 2004; Illes et al., 2006; Illes et al., 2008; Symposium,
2008). Much of the legal discussion involving incidental findings
has appropriately been framed in terms of federal Common Rule
requirements relating to the minimization of risks, the balancing
of research risks and benefits, a description of the reasonably
foreseeable risks and any benefits in the informed consent form,
the monitoring of data, and the provision to the research partici-
pant of significant new findings that may affect the participant’s
willingness to continue in the study (45 C.F.R., 2007a–c). The
Common Rule does not, however, directly address other key
questions, including whether researchers have an obligation to
look for incidental findings, the process that should be followed
when a researcher suspects an incidental finding, the appropri-
ateness of seeking a consultation regarding an incidental finding,
and the scope of disclosure to the research participant and her
physician. The Common Rule also does not provide specific
counsel regarding the best way to describe the possibility of inci-
dental findings in the informed consent form, whether research
participants may refuse to be told about incidental findings, the
locus of financial responsibility for follow-up care, and the role of
institutional review boards, funding agencies, and the govern-
ment in guiding the answers to these questions (Wolf, 2008b).
In the absence of federal direction, several groups of authors
have carefully considered the ethical and legal concerns posed by
incidental findings and have offered practical approaches for
handling them (Heinemann et al., 2007; Illes et al, 2008; Wolf,
2008b), although a consensus has yet to emerge (Wolf, 2008a).
In this article, I would like to examine the issue of incidental
findings in neuroimaging research from an American common law
perspective. Can U.S. case law provide any additional guidance for
institutions regarding how best to respond to incidental findings?
Have any courts specifically addressed the scope of any duties that
may apply to researchers in the context of incidental findings? If
not, may the scope of any researcher duties be mapped with refer-
ence to fiduciary, tort, contract, or entrustment theories of liability?
Incidental Findings Cases
A search in the combined Federal and State Cases database of
LexisNexis, an electronic legal research system, reveals 180
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American judicial opinions containing the phrase “incidental
finding,” most of which involve controversies unrelated to science
or medicine. Additional searches using phrases such as “unantici-
pated findings,” “unanticipated medical events,” “unforeseen
medical conditions,” and “unforeseen medical problems” yield
significantly more cases, although most are irrelevant. A few cases
are, however, worthy of review and discussion.
In Iacangelo v. Georgetown University, Karen Kerris participated
as a member of a control group in a neuroimaging study con-
ducted at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), where she
worked (Iacangelo, 2006). As part of the study, the investigators
scanned Ms. Kerris’ brain using magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) and discovered that she had a bithalamic arteriovenous
malformation (AVM) that measured between six and seven centi-
meters in diameter. According to the judicial opinion, “Ms. Kerris
was told that AVM was a terminal condition, and she was referred
to Defendant Georgetown University for an angiogram” (*1).
The passive language of the opinion does not clarify exactly who
told Ms. Kerris about the existence of her incidental finding or
that AVM was a terminal condition, although the opinion suggests
that it may have been a member of the research team because the
opinion had not yet identified anyone other than Ms. Kerris or
the NIH. The opinion also does not describe the procedures that
were followed for reviewing the participants’ scans or contacting
participants who had suspected incidental findings.
An angiogram conducted at Georgetown Hospital confirmed
that Ms. Kerris had an “AVM of the highest grade of severity
located deep within her brain.” A few months later, a physician at
Georgetown Hospital unsuccessfully treated Ms. Kerris with three
different embolization procedures. By the time of the lawsuit, which
stated multiple causes of action against the treating physician and
Georgetown Hospital, Ms. Kerris’ condition had deteriorated to
the point where she required a guardian. One of the legal issues
before the court was whether the treating physician was liable for
medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent to
treatment because he had used mixtures in the first embolization
procedure (Histoacryl® and Lipiodol®) that were not approved
for medical use in the U.S. and one of which (Histoacryl®) was
expressly contraindicated for use on the surface of the brain, in
the nervous system, or in the blood vessels.
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The defendants in the Iacangelo case included the treating
physician and Georgetown Hospital. The plaintiffs did not name
the NIH or any individual members of the research team as
defendants presumably because the plaintiffs could find no fault
with the team’s detection of the incidental finding or decision to
refer Ms. Kerris to a hospital for treatment. Treating physicians
who fail to detect potentially dangerous incidental findings in the
clinical setting, on the other hand, have been named as defen-
dants. In Lo v. Burke, a radiologist read a CT scan for a patient,
Mary Burke, who had suspected liver disease (Lo, 1995). The
radiologist failed to detect an incidental finding, which was an
unrelated three-centimeter cyst on Ms. Burke’s pancreas. Two
years later, the radiologist read a second CT scan for Ms. Burke
and observed a five-centimeter pancreatic cyst. As part of the radi-
ologist’s interpretation of the second scan, the radiologist reviewed
the first scan again and observed the existence of the three-
centimeter cyst, noting its subsequent growth in size. The radiolo-
gist subsequently reported the existence of the cyst, which was
removed and determined to be malignant. The patient died from
pancreatic cancer less than seven months after the second CT scan,
and the executor of the patient’s estate sued the radiologist for
wrongful death.
One of the issues before the court was whether the radiologist’s
failure to detect the three-centimeter cyst in the first scan caused
Ms. Burke’s death. The plaintiff’s expert witness, a general surgeon,
testified that most pancreatic cysts are discovered when they mea-
sure five to six centimeters and that the first CT scan showing the
three-centimeter cyst was “‘about as early as I have ever seen the
detection of a pancreatic cyst done’” (p. 313). The surgeon further
testified that if the cyst had been removed shortly after the first
CT scan, “no cancer could have later formed within the cyst to
cause Ms. Burke’s death” (p. 318). The court concluded that the
surgeon’s testimony provided the necessary causal link between
the radiologist’s negligence and Ms. Burke’s death.
The Iacangelo and Lo cases involved defendant physicians
who had treatment relationships with and primary duties of care
to their patients. These cases did not involve defendant researchers
whose stated goals included collecting data and creating general-
izable knowledge. The Iacangelo and Lo holdings thus do not
dictate that a researcher who fails to detect or report a potentially
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dangerous incidental finding on a research-grade scan will be
held to the same standard of care as are radiologists or other
physicians who read clinical-grade scans for specific patients in
the inpatient or outpatient setting (Morreim, 2004). What these
cases may suggest is that individuals whose conditions worsen and
the survivors of individuals who die may seek to impose liability
on: (1) the person who first reviewed the scan containing the
incidental finding if earlier treatment would have yielded a better
clinical outcome; or (2) a physician who subsequently and unsuc-
cessfully treated the condition. Whether researchers have an
independent and affirmative legal duty to seek, detect, and report
incidental findings is discussed in more detail below.
Informed Consent and Scope of Disclosure Cases
Beyond case law that expressly refers to incidental findings, several
well-known cases address more broadly the duties of researchers
with respect to the scope of disclosure of research risks. In Whitlock
v. Duke University, for example, Leonard Whitlock suffered organic
brain damage after participating in a simulated deep dive experi-
ment at Duke University (Whitlock, 1986). Mr. Whitlock subse-
quently sued Duke University and Dr. Bennett, the director of the
relevant laboratory, for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, loss of consortium, breach of the Common Rule, strict
liability for ultrahazardous activity, and strict liability for human
experimentation. In his fraud claim, Mr. Whitlock alleged that
Dr. Bennett intentionally failed to inform Mr. Whitlock of the
danger of organic brain damage by not specifically listing organic
brain damage as a risk on the consent form. Under North Carolina
law, a plaintiff claiming fraud must show: (1) the defendant made a
representation to a material fact, (2) the representation was false,
(3) the defendant knew the representation was false or made the
representation recklessly without any knowledge of its truth, (4)
the defendant made the false representation with the intention
that it should be relied on by plaintiffs, (5) the plaintiffs reasonably
relied upon the representation and acted upon it, and (6) the plain-
tiffs suffered injury. The court ultimately found that Mr. Whitlock,
an experienced diver who signed and read the consent-to-research
form that expressly advised him of the risks of death and disability
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as well as the experimental nature of the dive and the existence of
“unknown risks,” could not prevail on his fraud claim even though
the consent form did not specifically list organic brain injury. The
court reasoned that there was no evidence that Dr. Bennett knew
of the specific risk of organic brain damage. Stated in terms of the
fraud cause of action, Dr. Bennett did not falsely omit the risk of
organic brain damage on the consent form.
In his negligence claim, Mr. Whitlock alleged that Dr. Bennett
negligently failed to warn of the risk of organic brain injury.
Negligence claims require duty, breach of that duty, actual and
proximate cause, and compensable damages. In its examination
of the first element of the negligence cause of action, the scope of
the duty owed by Dr. Bennett to Mr. Whitlock, the Court relied
on the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the
Common Rule to hold that a researcher has a duty to “make
known to the subject all hazards reasonably to be expected and
the possible effects upon the health and person of the subject”
(p. 1471). The court also compared the strengths of the duties
applicable to researchers engaged in nontherapeutic experiments
and health care providers and found that researchers, not provid-
ers, have the higher duty of disclosure: “[T]he degree of required
disclosure of risks is higher in the nontherapeutic context than
required under [the North Carolina law applicable to health care
providers, which only requires health care provider to “apprise
the patient of the ‘usual and most frequent risks and hazards’ of
the procedure”]” (p. 1471).
Applying these principles to the case before it, the court
found that Dr. Bennett had a duty to inform Mr. Whitlock “of all
risks that [we]re reasonably foreseeable” (p. 1471). Because
Mr. Whitlock did not present any deposition, affidavit, or other
evidence showing that organic brain damage was a reasonably
foreseeable risk, the court granted summary judgment to
Dr. Bennett on Mr. Whitlock’s negligence claim (as well as his
conspiracy to commit fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and breach of
the Common Rule claims, which were based on the same factual
allegations).
Can Whitlock and other similar judicial opinions provide any
guidance to institutions regarding how best to disclose the possi-
bility of incidental findings in informed consent conversations and
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forms? Most of the relevant cases address a researcher’s duty to
disclose a risk of injury, such as organic brain injury, that may be
caused by an experimental drug, intervention, or other activity,
such as simulated deep-sea diving. The issue in the incidental
findings context is not the researcher’s duty to disclose a risk of
injury that may be caused by an MRI or other neuroimaging tech-
nology, such as a ferromagnetic injury. Instead, the issue is the
researcher’s duty to disclose the possibility that an unknown pre-
existing condition might become known and that the condition
might be potentially dangerous and require follow-up care. This
distinction is important. Under general principles of tort law,
individuals do not have a duty to warn of risks they did not create
absent a special relationship or other exceptional circumstances.
Whitlock and many of the other prominent informed consent
cases thus are not exactly on point, although they are relevant to
the extent they establish general rules relating to the scope of
disclosure of research risks.
In its discussion of the plaintiff’s fraud claim, Whitlock holds
that a researcher who does not know of a particular research risk
will not be liable for fraud for failing to disclose that risk. In its
discussion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim, Whitlock holds that a
researcher has a duty to disclose “all risks that are reasonably fore-
seeable,” not just the usual and most frequent risks (p. 1472). I
suspect that future courts might focus on these aspects of Whitlock
and, if presented with the issue, find that neuroimaging research-
ers have a duty to disclose not only the possibility of incidental
findings but also the types of incidental findings that are reason-
ably foreseeable. The question thus becomes whether a particular
incidental finding is reasonably foreseeable.
A number of studies published in the last decade in prominent
scientific journals have examined the prevalence of incidental
findings in neuroimaging studies. In one recent study examining
the prevalence of incidental findings in two thousand MRI
research participants, the authors found asymptomatic brain inf-
arcts, cerebral aneurysms, and benign primary tumors most
frequently, but also one malignant primary brain tumor, one case
of multiple cerebral metastases in a patient previously treated for
lung cancer, one large, chronic subdural hematoma in a patient
who had minor head trauma a month prior to the scan, and
several cases of cavernous angioma, arachnoid cysts, type I Chiari
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Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach 249
malformations, major-vessel stenosis, dermoid cysts, and white
matter lesions (Vernooij et al., 2007). A research participant
seeking to impose a stringent duty of disclosure on a researcher
might attempt to introduce these studies as evidence of the types
of incidental findings that are reasonably foreseeable. Although a
court likely would not impose a duty on a researcher to disclose
the possibility of each and every type of incidental finding that
has ever been detected in a reported neuroimaging study, a court
might impose a duty with respect to particular incidental findings
identified with some regularity in the scientific literature, reasoning
that these findings are reasonably foreseeable.
In the absence of specific guidance regarding the legally
required scope of disclosure, risk averse institutions may feel pres-
sured to disclose to prospective neuroimaging research participants
as many potential incidental findings as possible, a result referred
to as “over-disclosure” in other informed consent contexts. Some
prospective participants subject to over-disclosure may be over-
whelmed by the dozens of possible incidental findings and may
be unable to focus on the meaning and import of the most likely
or clinically significant findings. Other prospective participants
may simply ignore the dozens of possible incidental findings if
the relevant descriptions are too lengthy or legalistic. Until the
law clarifies the appropriate scope of disclosure, researchers,
institutional review boards, and legal counsel should work
together in an attempt to balance the benefits and risks of disclo-
sure and over-disclosure.
A Duty to Seek and Detect Incidental Findings?
The discussion above focused on the scope of a researcher’s
disclosure with respect to the possibility of incidental findings.
A second issue is whether a principal investigator or someone on
his or her behalf has an affirmative legal duty to seek, detect, and
report incidental findings. This analysis is complicated not only
by the absence of directly relevant case law, but also by the wide
variety of settings in which neuroimaging research is conducted
and the different education, training, and experience of the indi-
viduals who conduct neuroimaging research. Some neuroimaging
studies may be conducted within or adjacent to a hospital or med-
ical center, while others may not. In some laboratories, students may
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be permitted to scan participants independently (Illes, Kirschen,
et al., 2004), while in others, only senior members of the research
team may scan participants. Students and investigators who conduct
and participate in neuroimaging research may be training or
trained in a wide variety of medical and nonmedical fields includ-
ing neurology, neurosurgery, radiology, neuroradiology, family
practice, psychiatry, clinical psychology, experimental psychology,
neuropsychology, neuroscience, and even philosophy. Given the
variety of neuroimaging research settings, personnel, and protocol,
it is difficult to predict which legal duties courts will impose on
particular research activities. It may be helpful, however, to review
the causes of action stated most frequently by participants against
researchers and consider how these theories of liability may apply
in the context of incidental findings.
During the last two decades, research participants have filed
a number of lawsuits against researchers for physical and other
injuries and deaths that occurred during or shortly after partici-
pation in cell line, gene therapy, cancer vaccine, bone marrow,
and other experiments (Jansson, 2003; Morreim, 2004). Although
none of these lawsuits involved a claim based on a neuroimaging
researcher’s failure to seek, detect, or report an incidental finding,
the plaintiffs in these cases have attempted to impose liability on
researchers based on several different causes of action, including
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and breach of contract. The
potential application of these theories of liability in the context of
incidental findings follows.
Fiduciary Duties
A fiduciary relationship may be expressly or impliedly created
(Greenberg, 2003). Because it is unlikely that many researchers
expressly identify as fiduciaries vis-à-vis their participants, I will
focus on implied fiduciary relationships. Implied fiduciary rela-
tionships are premised on the specific facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction and the relationship of the parties.
These relationships have been found when confidence is reposed
by one individual (the principal) and trust is accepted by the
other individual (the fiduciary) (Greenberg, 2003). Implied fidu-
ciary relationships are two-way relationships: The principal must
have placed trust in the fiduciary and the fiduciary must have
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accepted that trust. Once the relationship is formed, the fiduciary
has a duty to act with undivided loyalty in the best interests of the
principal (Suthers, 2005). The fiduciary duty is extremely high,
and courts carefully scrutinize transactions between fiduciaries
and principals.
Courts have imposed fiduciary duties on trustees, corporate
directors, partners, lawyers, and financial planners, as well as some
physicians who treat patients in the clinical setting. In the context
of incidental findings, the threshold question would be whether
neuroimaging researchers have a fiduciary relationship with their
participants. A contingent question is whether a research participant
could succeed in litigation against a research team or individual
team member for breach of fiduciary duty based on the failure to
seek, detect, or report an incidental finding.
Research participants have sought to impose fiduciary duties
on researchers in other research contexts, although usually unsuc-
cessfully. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, a patient
(Moore) who underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, and
whose treating physician used the patient’s cells to establish and
patent a new cell line without his permission, sued the physician
(Dr. Golde), the Regents of the University of California (Regents),
a researcher employed by the Regents (Quan), and other parties
for breach of fiduciary duty and twelve additional causes of action
(Moore, 1990). The California Supreme Court applied the fidu-
ciary duty to Dr. Golde, but summarily dismissed the breach of
fiduciary cause of action with respect to the other defendants:
“The Regents, Quan [and others] are not physicians. In contrast
to Dr. Golde, none of these defendants stood in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with Moore or had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed
consent to medical procedures” (p. 133). By its express language,
Moore left open the issue of whether a researcher involved in an
informed consent process might have a fiduciary duty.
Other courts have dismissed breach-of-fiduciary-duty causes
of action when the research participant failed to present sufficient
evidence of the formation of the fiduciary relationship. In Greenberg
v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, the plaintiffs sued a
researcher, hospital, and research institute for breach of fiduciary
duty based on the defendants’ alleged failure to disclose material
information relating to their disease research (Greenberg, 2003).
When the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege
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any facts showing that the defendants had recognized or
accepted the trust, as required to form the fiduciary relationship,
the plaintiffs responded by alleging that the defendants impliedly
accepted the trust by undertaking research that they represented
as being for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The court disagreed, rea-
soning that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged the second
element of a fiduciary relationship—acceptance of trust by the
researchers—and that this element cannot be assumed from the
subjects’ research participation: “There is no automatic fiduciary
relationship that attaches when a researcher accepts medical
donations and the acceptance of trust, the second constitutive
element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a
donation is given” (p. 1072).
Other courts also have considered, at least in dicta, the ques-
tion of whether researchers owe their participants fiduciary
duties. Suthers v. Martin involved an investigation of an experi-
mental Parkinson’s treatment—glial-derived neurotrophic factor
(GDNF)—at several sites, including New York University (NYU)
(Suthers, 2005, 2006). Amgen, the trial sponsor, discontinued
the trials after data indicated that GDNF was neither safe nor
effective. Two of the research participants who received GDNF in
an extended version of the study conducted at NYU sued Amgen
to compel the provision of GDNF, which the participants believed
relieved their Parkinson’s symptoms. One of their causes of
action was breach of fiduciary duty, which the court refused to
impose on Amgen: “[T]here is no basis in fact or law to impose a
fiduciary duty running from the sponsor of an independent study
to participants who it does not select, has not met, and about
whom it may not know the details of their medical conditions”
(p. 429). Because the participants did not name NYU or its
researchers as defendants, the court did not address the applica-
bility of the fiduciary duty to the research team, although the
court noted in dicta one bioethicist’s criticism of the application
of fiduciary duties to researchers.
Notwithstanding these cases, the nature of the relationship
between researchers and participants continues to be debated. Some
plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that researchers are fiduciaries vis-à-vis
their participants. Attorney Alan Milstein, who successfully repre-
sented University of Pennsylvania gene therapy participant (and
decedent) Jesse Gelsinger, recently stated:
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Once the research subject [. . .] signs the informed consent document, a
fiduciary relationship is formed between the [principal investigator] and the
research subject. The very nature of scientific research on human subjects
creates special relationships out of which fiduciary duties arise, similar to
the physician/patient relationship. The fiduciary relationship is formed not
only by the informed consent agreement between the parties, but also by
the trust the subject necessarily places in the researcher (Milstein, 2008).
Milstein believes that neuroimaging researchers’ fiduciary duties
require a clinical-like review of neuroimages by qualified personnel
and that the “Good Samaritan Approach,” in which researchers
tell their prospective participants that scans are not clinical quality
and will not be reviewed by qualified medical personnel, would
constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty.
Other attorneys and scholars take a middle ground and admit
that there are important distinctions between the researcher–
participant relationship and the types of relationships traditionally
governed by fiduciary principles, although they use the concept
of the fiduciary relationship as a framework for thinking about
the researcher–participant relationship (Coleman, 2005). Finally,
some attorneys and scholars expressly oppose the application of
fiduciary duties to researchers, reasoning that the relationship
between researcher and participant differs fundamentally from
that between physician and patient, that clinical research should
not be conflated with medical care, and that the purpose of
research is not to benefit individuals (Heinemann et al., 2007).
A hypothetical or two may be used to illustrate the debate
regarding the nature of the researcher–participant relationship in
the context of incidental findings. First consider a nonphysician
neuroimaging researcher who conducts and reviews a low-quality
research-grade scan, fails to detect a small AVM, and therefore
has a participant who does not know to seek treatment that could
improve the participant’s clinical outcome. (Also assume that the
researcher accepted no responsibility for reviewing the scan for
incidental findings in the informed consent documentation or
other conversations with the participants.) Could the participant
or his or her survivors successfully argue that the researcher stood
in a fiduciary relationship with the participant and breached that
duty by failing to detect and report the AVM?
Second, consider a research team that is composed mostly of
nonphysician researchers but that hires or contracts with a diagnostic
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neuroradiologist for the sole purpose of reviewing all of the scans
for incidental findings to see which participants may require
follow-up treatment. Now assume that the neuroradiologist fails
to detect an incidental finding. Should a fiduciary duty be
imposed on the neuroradiologist or research team? If so, was
there a breach of that duty when the neuroradiologist failed to
detect and report the incidental finding?
Relying on the principles stated in Moore, Greenberg, and Suthers,
I suspect that a court may find insufficient evidence of the forma-
tion of the fiduciary relationship in the first hypothetical because
there is no evidence that the researcher expressly or impliedly
accepted the participant’s trust with respect to incidental find-
ings. In addition, the relevant case law discourages courts from
assuming the existence of the trust. The catch in the second
hypothetical is that a plaintiff’s lawyer may point to the research
team’s decision to hire the diagnostic neuroradiologist as evidence
of the research team’s acceptance of trust with respect to incidental
findings. This evidence may assist the plaintiff’s lawyer in surviving
a motion to dismiss or summary judgment on the breach of fidu-
ciary claim, although it is unclear how the court ultimately would
characterize the nature of the researcher–participant relation-
ship, especially given the availability of tort and other duties that
may be more appropriate.
Tort and Other Unspecified Duties
In a torts case based on negligence, a plaintiff will prevail if she
can prove a duty, a breach of that duty, actual and proximate
cause, and compensable damages. Courts have applied duties sound-
ing in tort to researchers before. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,
the court considered two separate negligence actions involving
children who allegedly developed elevated levels of lead dust in
their blood while participating in a research study (Grimes, 2001).
The court held that, “special relationships, out of which duties
arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can result
from the relationships between researcher and research subjects”
(p. 846). Perhaps because Grimes and other cases do not provide
much detail regarding the potential application of tort duties to
researchers, the application of these duties continues to be debated.
For example, Heinemann et al. (2007) suggest that researchers
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have a duty to “carefully inspect [. . .] and interpret [. . .]”
neuroimages according to “accepted scientific criteria,” but reason
that no higher duty applies because the purpose of the research
study is not the diagnosis of disease in individual patients (p. 1985).
Given the frequency with which negligence causes of action
have been stated against researchers in the past, I do anticipate
that tort duties may play a role in the resolution of future cases
that may arise in the context of incidental findings. Again, the
threshold question would be whether a court would find that the
standard of care requires neuroimaging researchers to seek and
detect incidental findings. Courts sometimes look to evidence of
industry custom for guidance regarding the applicable standard
of care. While the NIH gives full clinical brain scans to every
intramural neuroimaging study participant, other neuroimaging
research teams do not. The industry custom with respect to inci-
dental findings, at least outside the NIH, is thus unclear.
If a court did impose tort duties on a neuroimaging
researcher, the second question would be whether the researcher
breached those tort duties. In addition to allegations regarding
the failure to seek or detect incidental findings, the timing of any
disclosures that are (not) made to the participant may be relevant
to the existence of a breach. In Grimes, for example, the court
emphasized that the researchers should have disclosed the
elevated lead blood levels to the participants in a timely manner,
not at the conclusion of the study: “This duty [. . .] requires the
researcher to completely and promptly inform the subjects of
potential hazards [. . .]” (p. 843). Grimes suggests that neuroimaging
researchers should promptly inform their participants of
suspected incidental findings. Although Grimes does not identify
the exact time frame in which disclosure should occur, the opinion
suggests that the disclosure should neither be unreasonably
delayed nor postponed until the conclusion of the study.
Contract Duties
A somewhat more straightforward duty for a court to apply is a
contract duty. Over the last ten years, several groups of research
participants have sued researchers for breach of duties set forth in
research-related documents. In Grimes, the court held that consent
forms in nontherapeutic research projects could, under certain
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circumstances, constitute contracts (p. 858). Suthers also consid-
ered whether consent forms can constitute contracts and stated
in dicta that they may establish participant rights vis-à-vis
researchers (pp. 424–425; 427).
Assuming that a contract exists, the researcher would be
required to perform the obligations set forth in the contract or
pay damages for failure to perform. The scope of the researcher’s
contractual obligations would depend on the terms of the contract.
For example, if a consent form that constituted a contract stated
that, “Every scan will be reviewed by a research team member who
is a diagnostic neuroradiologist and who has been trained to
detect potentially dangerous incidental findings and report them
immediately to the participant to enable early diagnosis and
improve clinical outcomes,” a participant whose incidental find-
ing went undetected may have a relatively easy breach of contract
case. On the other hand, I suspect that a participant would have
greater difficulty proving breach of contract if the consent form
stated that, “(1) the brain scanning is for research purposes only;
(2) the brain scanning is not directed toward, or designed for,
clinical diagnosis; (3) the research team members are not trained
in diagnostic radiology; and (4) the research-grade scans are not
optimized to find brain abnormalities.” The extent to which
research consent forms are structured with an eye towards legal
risk management usually depends on the institution and may
change as researchers are sued for breach of contract more
frequently and as institutions become more risk averse. Case law
such as Grimes makes clear, however, that a researcher cannot
waive his or her other duties (whether they be characterized as
tort, fiduciary, or other unspecified duties) through exculpatory
language embedded in a contract: “A researcher’s duty is not
created by, or extinguished by, the consent of a research subject
or IRB approval. The duty to a vulnerable research subject is
independent of consent [. . .]” (p. 858).
Breach of Limited Entrustment
Scholars are beginning to consider alternative theories of liability
that may apply to neuroimaging researchers. One theory that
does not yet appear in the case law but has been suggested by
scholars is a theory of partial or limited entrustment, or bailment
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(Belsky and Richardson, 2004; Richardson, 2008; Richardson and
Belsky, 2004). Under the common law, bailment is a legal rela-
tionship in which physical possession of personal property is
transferred from one person (the bailor) to another person (the
bailee) who subsequently holds possession of the property for a
specific purpose. The bailee returns possession of the property to
the bailor when the purpose of the transfer has been accomplished.
In addition to completing the service(s) for which transfer of posses-
sion is required, bailees also have a duty of care with respect to the
subject matter of the bailment. In the classic bailment transaction
involving an automobile temporarily transferred by its owner to a
mechanic for repair, the mechanic also may be responsible for rescu-
ing the automobile from a fire that unexpectedly occurs next door.
Some scholars have suggested that the concept of bailment may
be a useful framework for considering whether neuroimaging
research participants have entrusted an aspect of their health to
researchers (Belsky and Richardson, 2004; Richardson and Belsky,
2004). In the context of incidental findings, some scholars have
suggested that research participants have partially and limitedly
entrusted neuroimaging researchers with certain aspects of their
health, and that diagnostic review of participant scans may be within
the scope of that entrustment (Richardson and Belsky, 2004). Other
scholars have criticized the application of the entrustment theory to
neuroimaging research, reasoning that clinical research does not
aim or promote the health of research subjects (Miller et al., 2008).
The possibility that future research participants may raise a
limited entrustment theory of liability is not out of the question
due to the frequency with which plaintiffs have made bailment
claims in clinical and other related health care contexts. An infer-
tile couple whose embryologist dropped a tray of nine fertilized
eggs, destroying eight of them, stated a bailment claim in their
petition (Institute for Women’s Health v. Imad, 2006); likewise,
plaintiffs whose deceased kins’ organs and tissues were removed
without consent and were sold for transplant, research, and med-
ical education also have stated bailment causes of action (Andrews,
2006). Whether a future court would consider an individual’s
decision to participate in neuroimaging research a bailment
transaction is unclear and likely would require a court to engage in
several different lines of analysis, including whether a participant’s
health constitutes transferable personal property (and, if not,
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whether the object of transfer must constitute personal property),
as well as any reasons that may support the extension of the bail-
ment theory to neuroimaging research. Reasons that have been
offered in support of the extension of the bailment theory to
neuroimaging research include the participant’s waiver of his or
her normal rights as a condition of participating in the research,
the research team’s superior knowledge in terms of understanding
the clinical significance of suspected incidental findings, and the
need for some researcher discretion given the difficulty associ-
ated with disclosing to future participants each and every possible
incidental finding and establishing a mutually agreed upon notifi-
cation and referral process for each incidental finding (Richardson
and Belsky, 2004).
If a court allowed the application of the theory of bailment to
neuroimaging research, a follow-up question would be whether the
defendant researcher as bailee satisfied his or her duty with respect
to the participant’s health. In traditional bailment transactions, the
scope of the bailee’s duty varies depending on who benefits from
the bailment (Melly, 2007). A bailee may be required to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care if the bailment is for the mutual
benefit of the parties; great care if the bailment is for the sole bene-
fit of the bailee; and slight (or less than ordinary and reasonable)
care if the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailor (Melly,
2007). The scope of the bailee’s duty also depends on the express
or implied terms of any bailment contract (Melly, 2007).
Applying these principles to a standard neuroimaging
research protocol involving a healthy participant who is not
expected to benefit from scanning and a researcher who is
expected to benefit from the collection of the participants’ data,
a court might find that a neuroimaging researcher has a duty that
falls somewhere between ordinary and reasonable care and great
care. Informed consent or other “bailment” documentation that
states that the research team will seek, detect, and report inciden-
tal findings, or that suggests that the research protocol is
designed and the research team is trained to seek and detect
anomalies, may further support the imposition of a nonminimal
duty. I suspect that consent conversation and documentation that
clearly informs the participant that the research protocol is not
designed and the research team is not trained to seek or detect
anomalies may have the opposite effect.
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Conclusion
Much of the legal discussion involving incidental findings has
appropriately been framed in terms of federal Common Rule
requirements, but the common law can provide additional guidance
with respect to the scope of duties when federal standards are neces-
sarily vague. Although U.S. common law does not specifically
address the duties of American researchers with respect to inciden-
tal findings, the scope of researcher duties may be mapped with ref-
erence to fiduciary, tort, contract, and bailment theories of liability.
Although I expect future plaintiffs to bring claims against
researchers based on all four theories of liability, I anticipate that
plaintiffs may have some success in either or both contract- and
negligence-based lawsuits when the research team includes an indi-
vidual such as a neuroradiologist who is trained to seek and detect
brain anomalies, the research protocol states that the duty or role
of this individual is to provide diagnostic review of participant
scans, and the individual fails to review a scan or fails to detect an
anomaly listed in the informed consent documentation (for breach
of contract obligations) or that a reasonably prudent neuroradiolo-
gist would have detected in the same or similar circumstances (for
breach of tort duties). On the other hand, participants may have
difficulty proving breach of contract duties in cases in which partic-
ipants are informed that the brain scans provided are for research
purposes only; the brain scanning is not directed toward, or
designed for, clinical diagnosis; the research team members are
not trained in diagnostic radiology; and the research-grade scans
are not optimized to find brain abnormalities.
I suspect that future courts will hesitate to apply fiduciary
duties to researchers whose goals include the collection of data,
the creation of generalizable knowledge, or other goals that
may conflict with the bests interests of the participants, as well as
bailment theories of liability, which courts may find too novel, at
least initially, to apply outside the context of traditionally trans-
ferred personal property. Given the increasing number of law-
suits filed by participants and their families against researchers,
as well as the number of lawsuits that contain fiduciary and
other novel claims, however, the application of these theories of
liability in the context of incidental findings must be continually
monitored and assessed.
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